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Abstract
The COVID-19 crisis represents the most dangerous threat to public health since the H1N1 influenza
pandemic of 1918. So far, the disease due to the SARS-CoV-2 virus has been countered with extreme
measures at national level that attempt to suppress epidemic growth. However, these approaches require
quick adoption and enforcement in order to effectively curb virus spread, and may cause unprecedented
socio-economic impact. A viable alternative to mass surveillance and rule enforcement is harnessing
collective intelligence by means of citizen empowerment. Mobile applications running on personal devices
could significantly support this kind of approach by exploiting context/location awareness and data
collection capabilities. In particular, technology-assisted location and contact tracing, if broadly adopted,
may help limit the spread of infectious diseases by raising end-user awareness and enabling the adoption
of selective quarantine measures. In this paper, we outline general requirements and design principles
of personal applications for epidemic containment running on common smartphones, and we present a
tool, called “diAry” or “digital Ariadne”, based on voluntary location and Bluetooth tracking on personal
devices, supporting a distributed query system that enables fully anonymous, privacy-preserving contact
tracing. We look forward to comments, feedback, and further discussion regarding contact tracing solutions
for pandemic containment.
Keywords: Citizen empowerment; Collective intelligence; Mobile app; Contact tracing; Epidemic
control; Privacy; Anonymity; COVID-19.
1. Introduction
The novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 and its
rapid spread have established a pandemic of
global proportions over the course of the first
months of 2020. High fatality rates detected
in the first affected regions are expected to be
even higher in countries with an older popu-
lation, low-income, or lack of suitable health-
care facilities [1]. In the absence of a viable
vaccine, so far, the spreading of the disease
due to the SARS-CoV-2 virus has been coun-
tered in many countries with countermeasures
that attempt to suppress epidemic growth,
thus avoiding to overwhelm the healthcare
system with an unmanageable number of pa-
tients. The reduction of contagion is achieved
through a set of increasingly severe measures
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that limit personal freedom and entail strong
socio-economic drawbacks, going well beyond
mass gathering prohibition and case isolation.
Social distancing rules, including school and
university closure, household quarantine, inter-
nal and cross-border mobility constraints, and
selective closure of non-essential productive
and commercial activities, have brought many
countries to complete lockdown [2].
All these approaches require quick adop-
tion and strict enforcement, in order to ef-
fectively curb virus spread in the short term.
As observed in the 1918 pandemic, there is
a strong correlation between excess mortality
and earliness of containment measures. Con-
tainment interventions that are introduced too
late or lifted too early were shown to have very
limited effect [3].
In the long term, governments are required
to trade off the adoption of dramatic full lock-
down measures with more lax interventions.
For instance, progressively adopting temporary
small-scale contagion suppression actions that
aim at keeping the virus’ reproduction number,
R0, at a level that does not exceed the health-
care system’s capacity. Adaptive adoption of
these kinds of containment policies at a re-
gional level is expected to be effective even if
enforced for shorter periods of time [2].
The triggering of circumscribed quaran-
tine measures can be directed through the
widespread adoption of technological tools
that allow tracing contacts and interactions
with known cases of contagion [4]. Mobile
apps running on personal smartphones are es-
pecially attractive as solutions because they en-
able immediate deployment on existing hard-
ware and a quick response [5]. Several ap-
proaches of this kind have been proposed
over the course of the last weeks, giving raise
to a growing debate around privacy implica-
tions and potential risks of mass surveillance
and stigmatization [6, 7], that have prompted
authorities to provide recommendations and
guidelines [8], and big players to develop ad
hoc cross-platform protocols [9].
In this paper, we suggest that these con-
tact tracing tools should be designed to sup-
port end-user empowerment, as opposed to
mass surveillance, granting citizens more data,
awareness, and control, as envisioned by Nanni
et al. [10]. In Section 2, we outline the ba-
sic requirements and the founding principles
on which they should be based. In Section 3,
we present a location/contact tracing solution,
composed of a mobile app and a distributed
query system, designed to meet these critical
requirements. The proposed system allows in-
dividuals to keep track of movements and con-
tacts on their own private devices and to use
local traces to select relevant notifications and
alerts from health authorities, thus completely
eschewing, by design, any risk of surveillance.
2. Requirements and Design
Principles
Taking end-user empowerment as the found-
ing principle, in this section we outline require-
ments and design principles that address both
regulatory and technical issues. Compliance
with national and international regulation is
essential to protect natural persons and their
fundamental rights and freedoms, while tech-
nical requirements are mainly meant to rec-
oncile dependability needs with the features
of general-purpose personal devices, charac-
terized by software fragmentation, hardware
diversity, variety of non-exclusive usage modes,
lack of calibration, limited resources, and un-
trained users.
a. Collective intelligence. Systems based on
the voluntary participation of individuals, per-
forming a collective effort in their pursuit of
a common goal, leverage a form of collective
intelligence, which is the only alternative to
mass surveillance and enforcement. ICT so-
lutions should support and encourage such
collaborative behaviors.
b. Social responsibility. Individual participa-
tion in a collective effort towards a common
goal is an act of social responsibility. The tech-
nology adopted must make the social value of
end-user’s behavior clearly perceptible.
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c. Awareness and control. Technology is not
infallible and systems may not always behave
as expected. Mobile apps should not induce
end-users to simply rely on them. Rather, they
should empower end-users by granting them
control and awareness of the data gathering
process and by allowing them to browse their
data and possibly add spontaneous notes.
d. Privacy and anonymity by design. Pro-
tection of sensitive data, such as locations or
health-related information, cannot rely exclu-
sively on trust or security promises. The sys-
tem must be designed to keep user data private
at all times, ideally storing them exclusively on
the user’s device, and to make identification
impossible a posteriori.
e. Technology agnosticism. Contact tracing
is a challenging task. In spite of the many ap-
proaches that have been proposed, no single
technology has proven to offer the ultimate
solution. For instance, location services have
limited accuracy, especially indoor, while Blue-
tooth proximity does not reveal the exposure to
indirect contagion (through infected surfaces).
The solution of choice should exploit all avail-
able technologies and be open to any improve-
ment or integration.
f. Effectiveness. The effectiveness of contain-
ment measures based on the voluntary adop-
tion of a mobile app strongly depends on the
percentage of the population, making proper
use of that app. Although this is always true,
each solution has to be evaluated in different
scenarios, including those well below the nom-
inal critical mass of the target technology. Two
types of performance indicators have to be
used, to measure the support that app can pro-
vide both to end-users tested/diagnosed pos-
itive to COVID-19, willing to cooperate with
health authorities, and to all other individuals
possibly infected by them, who should take
timely countermeasures.
g. Interoperability. Interoperability must be
pursued as much as possible, in order to reduce
the critical mass requirements of each single
system and to fully exploit their potential. To
this purpose, open standard protocols should
be preferred to closed ad hoc ones, cooperation
among institutions must be technically sup-
ported, and integration with synergistic health-
care systems must be enabled.
h. Openness of source code. Open-source
access to all system components is the key
to speed up development, ensure continuous
improvement, and guarantee coherence be-
tween specification and implementation. Trans-
parency is essential both for end-users and for
health authorities possibly adopting the solu-
tion.
i. Openness of statistical data. Statistical
data can provide valuable information to eval-
uate the effectiveness of epidemic containment,
to monitor contagion, and to drive timely de-
cisions. All statistical information that can
be provided by end-users on a voluntary ba-
sis, without jeopardizing their privacy and
anonymity, is worth being gathered and made
available as an open dataset. Open data en-
ables study and research without providing
questionable competitive advantages to any
player.
j. Avoidance of false alarms. The ultimate
goal of contact tracing systems is to reach sus-
ceptible or asymptomatic individuals who are
considered to be the target of specific mea-
sures (e.g., quarantining or testing) according
to the containment policies adopted. The solu-
tion adopted must minimize unneeded alarms
that can overwhelm the healthcare system and
spread panic.
k. Avoidance of surveillance and stigmatiza-
tion. The fear of being watched and stigma-
tized may hinder the acceptance of contact
tracing technologies. Ideal solutions should
prevent mass surveillance and stigmatization
by design, by keeping end-user traces in their
own devices and by making it impossible for
end-users to identify the source of contagion.
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l. Scalability. The higher is the adoption rate,
the more effective the solution is. Hence, scala-
bility is a key requirement. Since the target de-
vices, i.e., smartphones, have their own storage,
computation, sensing, and communication re-
sources, scalability can be inherently achieved
by exploiting local resources as much as possi-
ble without triggering any network effect.
3. Digital Ariadne
Digital Ariadne or ‘diAry’ is a privacy-
preserving open-source tool, developed by
DIGIT srl and the University of Urbino, that
allows users to trace their movements and
contacts, while also allowing governments or
healthcare agencies to rapidly direct their epi-
demic containment efforts, in a way that aligns
with the principles outlined above.
The system is composed of: a mobile ap-
plication, that is voluntarily installed by users
on their smartphones, keeping track of their
locations through the device’s GPS sensor and
interactions with other users through Bluetooth
radio beacons, a privacy-aware reward system,
which incentivizes app usage while collecting
anonymous usage information to feed an open
data set, and a distributed query system that
allows recognized public authorities to selec-
tively and anonymously notify users about pos-
sible contagion sources. The mobile app works
in background, with careful usage of battery
and storage and without impairing the func-
tioning of the personal devices. Nonetheless,
it provides a rich user interface to make end-
users fully responsible and aware of their own
contribution to epidemic containment.
Source code of the mobile applications and
the back-end service, both currently in active
development, is available on GitHub1.
3.1. Mobile app
The Digital Ariadne mobile application is de-
veloped using the Flutter framework for Ap-
ple iOS and Google Android. A combination
of movement detection with the built-in ac-
celerometers, activity recognition, data from
GPS sensors, and Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)
transmission is used to adaptively track the
user’s movements and interactions without
negatively impacting battery and storage ca-
pacity of the device. Traces are collected au-
tonomously by a background service launched
by the application, but end-users can decide
at any time to interact with the app to browse
stored data, to force sampling, to mark known
locations or the add notes.
Figure 1: Main screen of the application.
Tracking status is displayed on the main
app screen, as shown in Figure 1. Three con-
centric circles, representing the 24 hours of the
current day, show the detected movements, the
amount of time spent in known locations, and
the notes added by the end-user.
This information is stored for a maximum
duration of 30 days on the device. The app
approximately requires 1 MB of data to store
information about a day of full tracking (this
requirement may slightly increase in case of
frequent movement).
1Source code: https://github.com/digit-srl/diAry-apps and https://github.com/digit-srl/diAry-backend.
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3.1.1. Location tracking
The app, once activated by the user, starts track-
ing the device’s location and records detected
positions and movements. Location tracking
is adaptive, based on the user’s activity and
speed, in order to provide sufficient precision
in the case of movement and low battery con-
sumption otherwise.
Figure 2: Map view of tracked locations.
The user may voluntarily mark known lo-
cations through the app interface, thus allow-
ing to specify places such as home, workplace,
school, or any other locations. Access to and
departure from these locations are detected
through geofencing and allow the user to have
a quick overview of his or her movements
throughout the day.
Also, the user may decide to add notes to
a specific location and time of the day, in or-
der to remember specific events or situations
that may be relevant for contact tracing pur-
poses. User movements, known locations, and
notes are shown on an interactive map like in
Figure 2.
3.1.2. Interaction tracking
The diAry app makes use of the Temporary
Contact Numbers (TCN) contact tracing proto-
col in order to broadcast randomly-generated
and anonymous identifiers, which are updated
every few minutes [11]. All installations of
the app keep a fully-local log of every iden-
tifier that has been broadcast and every iden-
tifiers that was received from other devices
making use of the same TCN protocol. This
data, which expires together with location data
after 30 days, never leaves the phone and is not
linked to private user information.
3.2. Statistical open data set
The Digital Ariadne system makes use of a
server-side component that is used to collect
daily usage statistics in an anonymous fash-
ion. Users are never required to identify them-
selves and no user-identifying information is
transmitted at any point. Communication be-
tween mobile applications and the back-end
makes use of secure connections using widely-
adopted standards (HTTPS with optional cer-
tificate pinning).
An anonymous installation ID is generated
upon the first launch of the mobile application.
This ID is a randomly generated UUID and
is used only to distinguish individual installa-
tions for statistical data collection and aggrega-
tion. Installation IDs are not linked to private
user information or device characteristics.
Daily statistics include, for each installation:
1. The total number of minutes of active
tracking by the mobile app,
2. The centroid of the tracked locations, ap-
proximated to a precision of ca. 0.02 lat-
itude and longitude degrees, that is ap-
proximately 2–3 km, in order to avoid
identification,
3. The lenght of the diagonal of the bound-
ing box containing all tracked locations,
4. The count of known locations visited dur-
ing the day,
5. The count of notes added by the user,
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6. The count of GPS samples recorded and,
possibly, discarded due to insufficient ac-
curacy,
7. The amount of minutes tracked at home.
Collected information, made available as
open data set, gives an indication of how the
mobile app is used, allowing researchers and
policy makers to gauge the effectiveness of
measures adopted at regional or national level.
3.3. Distributed queries for call to ac-
tions
While personal data never leaves the user’s
device and collected statistical data cannot be
used to identify users, Digital Ariadne is de-
signed to give designated territorial or national
authorities access to the system through a
dashboard allowing them to publish epidemic-
related “call to actions”.
Call to actions can be seen as geographical
and temporal distributed queries that operate
with the following process: (a) an authority cre-
ates a new call to action based on a sequence
of geolocated and timestamped points and/or
a set of temporary contact numbers, (b) the
call to action is stored by the back-end service
until it expires, (c) the mobile app automati-
cally downloads relevant call to actions, (d) the
mobile app matches call to actions to private
location and contact data, in order to verify
whether the user has been exposed to possible
sources of contagion, (e) if there is a match, the
user is privately notified and can access infor-
mation associated to the call to action. Match-
ing users may also directly choose to interact
with the public authority, optionally disclosing
part of their traces.
Thus, a call to action is composed of a series
of geographical regions (geo-polygons), associ-
ated time intervals, and a series of temporary
contact numbers (TCNs). The match is per-
formed by checking whether the user has been
within the indicated region in a given time
period, or if any TCN is found among local
records. Sensitivity of the match can be fine-
tuned by the health authority, by indicating
a maximum distance from the region and a
minimum time interval of match (i.e., expo-
sure) in order to alert the user, with the intent
of reducing panic and avoiding unnecessary
alarms.
3.3.1. Creating call to actions in the case of
contagion
When diAry users are positively diagnosed,
they may grant to healthcare or government
authorities partial access to their local traces,
inlcuding geolocations, timestamps, and the
list of temporary contact numbers generated
by the diAry app.
This information can be used to generate
anonymous calls to action made accessible to
all the instances of the app in the interested
area. Call to actions are processed locally to
each installation and displayed to end-users if
and only if their traces match filtering criteria.
This mechanism enables anonymous tracking
of past interactions of diagnosed individuals,
alerting potentially infected diAry users and
prompting them for self-isolation and further
testing.
3.4. User incentives
To further raise awareness and promote adop-
tion and usage of the application, diAry inte-
grates with the ‘Worth One Minute’ platform.
The platform has adopted diAry as an instru-
ment for the common good and rewards users
with anonymous vouchers (called WOMs) for
their collaborative behaviour [12]. These vouch-
ers are intended to provide: (a) a simple gami-
fied experience that allows users to earn points
and thus obtain positive feedback of their vol-
untary contribution to epidemic containment;
(b) a tangible currency-like reward that can be
adopted as a voucher system at a local and na-
tional scale to promote microeconomic growth
in a post-lockdown scenario; (c) a perception
of the social value of individual actions and
behaviours.
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4. Conclusions
In this paper, we have argued citizen empow-
erment to be the foundation on which novel
epidemic control technologies must be built
as a viable alternative to mass surveillance.
General design principles driving the develop-
ment of such technologies have been outlined
and applied to the design of Digital Ariadne,
an open-source privacy-preserving instrument
that combines location and contact tracing ca-
pabilities to collect local traces that can be cross-
matched with authoritative alerts and calls to
action without leaving the end-user’s device.
Just like Ariadne’s thread, the data stored
on personal smartphones offers a trusted trace
to find a way out of the maze of COVID-19.
We invite any kind of feedback on this
whitepaper, including comments on the design
principles and technical contributions to the
open-source diAry project.
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